937f2a833b
Root cause: PRICE_STABILITY_INTERVAL (300s) was too long relative to MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL (60s). After any significant trade moving the tick >1000 positions, the 5-minute TWAP lagged behind the current price by hundreds of ticks, exceeding MAX_TICK_DEVIATION (50). Recenter reverted with "price deviated from oracle" for ~285s — creating a window where the LM could not reposition and adversary parasitic LP could extract value from passive holders. Fix: Reduce PRICE_STABILITY_INTERVAL from 300s to 30s. This ensures TWAP converges within the 60s cooldown while still preventing same-block manipulation (30s > ~12s Ethereum mainnet block time). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
36 lines
2.2 KiB
JSON
36 lines
2.2 KiB
JSON
{
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"date": "2026-03-22",
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"issue": 517,
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"title": "Adversary parasitic LP extracts 29% from holder — all recenters fail",
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"scenario": "staker-vs-holder",
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"status": "fixed",
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"root_cause": {
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"summary": "PRICE_STABILITY_INTERVAL (300s) too long relative to MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL (60s)",
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"detail": "After a large trade moving the tick >1000 positions, the 5-minute TWAP average lagged behind the current price by hundreds of ticks, far exceeding MAX_TICK_DEVIATION (50). Recenter reverted with 'price deviated from oracle' for ~285s after each trade, creating a window where the LM could not reposition. The adversary's parasitic LP captured fees during this unprotected window.",
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"revert_reasons": {
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"after_adversary_setup": "price deviated from oracle",
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"after_holder_buy": "price deviated from oracle",
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"after_adversary_attack": "price deviated from oracle",
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"after_holder_sell": "amplitude not reached"
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},
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"johba_comment_confirmed": "Parasitic LP does not directly block recentering (V3 positions are independent). The revert is from the TWAP stability check, not from position interference."
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},
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"fix": {
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"file": "onchain/src/abstracts/PriceOracle.sol",
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"change": "PRICE_STABILITY_INTERVAL reduced from 300 to 30 seconds",
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"rationale": "30s still prevents same-block manipulation (Ethereum mainnet ~12s block time) while ensuring TWAP converges well within the 60s cooldown. After the fix, recenter succeeds within 61s of any trade.",
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"security_impact": "Manipulation window reduced from 5 min to 30s. Attacker must hold manipulated price for 30+ seconds (2.5 blocks) before recenter accepts it. Combined with 60s cooldown, total manipulation window is <60s."
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},
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"tests_added": [
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"testRecenterAfterLargeBuy_TWAPConverges — verifies recenter works after 5 ETH buy + 61s wait",
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"testRecenterRejectsSameBlockManipulation — verifies TWAP check still blocks <30s manipulation",
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"testAdversarialLP_HolderProtected — full parasitic LP scenario, holder loss < 5%"
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],
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"test_results": {
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"total": 256,
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"passed": 255,
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"failed": 1,
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"skipped": 0,
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"pre_existing_failure": "FitnessEvaluator.t.sol::testBatchEvaluate (requires FITNESS_MANIFEST_DIR env var)"
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}
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}
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