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fix: address review findings — CREATE2 guard, transition test, docs

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- LiquidityManager.setFeeDestination: add CREATE2 bypass guard — also
  blocks re-assignment when the current feeDestination has since acquired
  bytecode (was a plain address when set, contract deployed to it later)
- LiquidityManager.setFeeDestination: expand NatSpec to document the
  EOA-mutability trade-off and the CREATE2 guard explicitly
- Test: add testSetFeeDestinationEOAToContract_Locks covering the
  realistic EOA→contract transition (the primary lock-activation path)
- red-team.sh: add comment that DEPLOYER_PK is Anvil account-0 and must
  only be used against a local ephemeral Anvil instance
- ARCHITECTURE.md: document feeDestination conditional-lock semantics and
  contrast with Kraiken's strictly set-once liquidityManager/stakingPool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
openhands 2026-03-12 17:13:50 +00:00
parent 9ff96ff137
commit b902b89e3b
4 changed files with 35 additions and 4 deletions
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docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
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@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ Optimizer.sol (UUPS Upgradeable Proxy)
- **Optimizer → Stake**: reads sentiment data (% staked, avg tax rate)
- **Optimizer upgrades**: UUPS proxy, admin-only `_authorizeUpgrade()`
- **feeDestination receives both WETH and KRK fees**: during `recenter()`, Uniswap V3 fee collection produces both tokens. WETH fees AND KRK fees are forwarded to `feeDestination` (see `LiquidityManager._scrapePositions()`).
- **feeDestination is a conditional-lock (not set-once)**: `setFeeDestination()` (deployer-only) allows repeated changes while the destination is an EOA, enabling staged deployment and testing. The moment a contract address is set, `feeDestinationLocked` is set to `true` and no further changes are allowed. A CREATE2 guard also blocks re-assignment if the current destination has since acquired bytecode. This differs from Kraiken's `liquidityManager`/`stakingPool` which are strictly set-once.
- **feeDestination KRK excluded from outstanding supply**: `_getOutstandingSupply()` subtracts `kraiken.balanceOf(feeDestination)` before computing scarcity, because protocol-held KRK cannot be sold into the floor and should not inflate the supply count.
- **Staking pool KRK excluded from outstanding supply**: `_getOutstandingSupply()` also subtracts `kraiken.balanceOf(stakingPoolAddr)`, because staked KRK is locked and similarly cannot be sold into the floor.