fix: SECURITY_REVIEW.md references obsolete recenterAccess pattern (#838)

- Update M-3 finding: recenterAccess was removed; MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL
  (60s) cooldown now enforced unconditionally — downgrade severity to
  Informational (resolved)
- Update Access Control Summary: remove recenterAccess rows, reflect
  permissionless recenter() with cooldown
- Update Conclusion: mark M-3 as resolved
- Fix stale M-1 impact note that mentioned recenterAccess as a workaround
- deployment.md: remove Section 3.2 "Set Recenter Access" (setRecenterAccess
  no longer exists); update 3.3 first-recenter comment
- deployment.md: replace recenterAccess() verification call with
  lastRecenterTime() check
- deployment.md §6.1: rewrite Pause Recentering note — no access-control
  switch exists, cooldown is the only rate limiter
- deployment.md §6.5: remove stale setRecenterAccess(0xdEaD) instruction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/technical/deployment.md

@@ -100,22 +100,13 @@ cast send $LIQUIDITY_MANAGER --value 10ether \
   --mnemonic "$(cat .secret)"
 ```
 
-### 3.2 Set Recenter Access
+### 3.2 Trigger First Recenter
 
-Restrict `recenter()` to the txnBot address:
-
-```bash
-# Must be called by feeDestination (multisig)
-cast send $LIQUIDITY_MANAGER "setRecenterAccess(address)" $TXNBOT_ADDRESS \
-  --rpc-url $BASE_RPC \
-  --mnemonic "$(cat .secret)"  # or via multisig
-```
-
-### 3.3 Trigger First Recenter
+`recenter()` is permissionless — any address may call it. The 60-second cooldown (`MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL`) and TWAP oracle check are always enforced.
 
 ```bash
 # Wait for pool to accumulate some TWAP history (~5 minutes of trades)
-# Then trigger first recenter (must be called by recenterAccess)
+# Anyone can trigger the first recenter; txnBot will take over ongoing calls
 cast send $LIQUIDITY_MANAGER "recenter()" \
   --rpc-url $BASE_RPC \
   --from $TXNBOT_ADDRESS
@@ -187,7 +178,7 @@ cast call $KRAIKEN "peripheryContracts()" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC  # LM + Stake addr
 
 # 2. LiquidityManager
 cast call $LM "feeDestination()" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC       # Should be multisig
-cast call $LM "recenterAccess()" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC       # Should be txnBot
+cast call $LM "lastRecenterTime()" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC     # Should be non-zero after first recenter
 cast call $LM "positions(0)" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC           # Floor position (after recenter)
 cast call $LM "positions(1)" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC           # Anchor position
 cast call $LM "positions(2)" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC           # Discovery position
@@ -212,17 +203,9 @@ cast balance $LM --rpc-url $BASE_RPC                       # Should show funded
 
 ### 6.1 Pause Recentering
 
-**WARNING:** `revokeRecenterAccess()` does NOT pause recentering. It makes `recenter()` permissionless (anyone can call it with 60-second cooldown + TWAP check). In an attack scenario, this would make things worse.
+**NOTE:** `recenter()` is permissionless — there is no access-control switch to block it. The only mechanism that prevents a recenter is the 60-second `MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL` cooldown and the TWAP oracle check. There is no admin function to revoke or grant access.
 
-To truly lock out recenters, set `recenterAccess` to a burn address that no one controls:
-
-```bash
-# Called by feeDestination (multisig) — sets access to a dead address
-cast send $LM "setRecenterAccess(address)" 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD \
-  --rpc-url $BASE_RPC
-```
-
-This leaves existing positions in place but prevents any new recenters. LP positions continue earning fees. To resume, call `setRecenterAccess()` with the txnBot address again.
+In an attack scenario the most effective response is to upgrade or replace the contract (see §6.3 / §6.4). Existing positions remain in place and continue earning fees regardless of recenter activity.
 
 ### 6.2 Upgrade Optimizer to Safe Defaults
 
@@ -252,7 +235,7 @@ If the optimizer needs temporary override, deploy a new implementation with hard
 ### 6.5 Known Attack Response: Floor Ratchet
 
 If floor ratchet extraction is detected (rapid recenters + floor tick creeping toward current price):
-1. **Immediately** set recenter access to burn address (`0xdEaD`) — do NOT use `revokeRecenterAccess()` as it makes recenter permissionless
+1. **Immediately** assess severity — `recenter()` is permissionless (no access-control switch exists); the 60s cooldown is the only rate limiter
 2. Assess floor position state via `positions(0)`
 3. Deploy patched LiquidityManager if fix is ready
 4. Current mitigation: bear-mode parameters (AW=100) create 7000-tick floor distance, making ratchet extraction significantly harder