fix: SECURITY_REVIEW.md references obsolete recenterAccess pattern (#838)

- Update M-3 finding: recenterAccess was removed; MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL
  (60s) cooldown now enforced unconditionally — downgrade severity to
  Informational (resolved)
- Update Access Control Summary: remove recenterAccess rows, reflect
  permissionless recenter() with cooldown
- Update Conclusion: mark M-3 as resolved
- Fix stale M-1 impact note that mentioned recenterAccess as a workaround
- deployment.md: remove Section 3.2 "Set Recenter Access" (setRecenterAccess
  no longer exists); update 3.3 first-recenter comment
- deployment.md: replace recenterAccess() verification call with
  lastRecenterTime() check
- deployment.md §6.1: rewrite Pause Recentering note — no access-control
  switch exists, cooldown is the only rate limiter
- deployment.md §6.5: remove stale setRecenterAccess(0xdEaD) instruction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/technical/deployment.md

@@ -100,22 +100,13 @@ cast send $LIQUIDITY_MANAGER --value 10ether \
   --mnemonic "$(cat .secret)"
 ```
 
-### 3.2 Set Recenter Access
+### 3.2 Trigger First Recenter
 
-Restrict `recenter()` to the txnBot address:
-
-```bash
-# Must be called by feeDestination (multisig)
-cast send $LIQUIDITY_MANAGER "setRecenterAccess(address)" $TXNBOT_ADDRESS \
-  --rpc-url $BASE_RPC \
-  --mnemonic "$(cat .secret)"  # or via multisig
-```
-
-### 3.3 Trigger First Recenter
+`recenter()` is permissionless — any address may call it. The 60-second cooldown (`MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL`) and TWAP oracle check are always enforced.
 
 ```bash
 # Wait for pool to accumulate some TWAP history (~5 minutes of trades)
-# Then trigger first recenter (must be called by recenterAccess)
+# Anyone can trigger the first recenter; txnBot will take over ongoing calls
 cast send $LIQUIDITY_MANAGER "recenter()" \
   --rpc-url $BASE_RPC \
   --from $TXNBOT_ADDRESS
@@ -187,7 +178,7 @@ cast call $KRAIKEN "peripheryContracts()" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC  # LM + Stake addr
 
 # 2. LiquidityManager
 cast call $LM "feeDestination()" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC       # Should be multisig
-cast call $LM "recenterAccess()" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC       # Should be txnBot
+cast call $LM "lastRecenterTime()" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC     # Should be non-zero after first recenter
 cast call $LM "positions(0)" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC           # Floor position (after recenter)
 cast call $LM "positions(1)" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC           # Anchor position
 cast call $LM "positions(2)" --rpc-url $BASE_RPC           # Discovery position
@@ -212,17 +203,9 @@ cast balance $LM --rpc-url $BASE_RPC                       # Should show funded
 
 ### 6.1 Pause Recentering
 
-**WARNING:** `revokeRecenterAccess()` does NOT pause recentering. It makes `recenter()` permissionless (anyone can call it with 60-second cooldown + TWAP check). In an attack scenario, this would make things worse.
+**NOTE:** `recenter()` is permissionless — there is no access-control switch to block it. The only mechanism that prevents a recenter is the 60-second `MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL` cooldown and the TWAP oracle check. There is no admin function to revoke or grant access.
 
-To truly lock out recenters, set `recenterAccess` to a burn address that no one controls:
-
-```bash
-# Called by feeDestination (multisig) — sets access to a dead address
-cast send $LM "setRecenterAccess(address)" 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD \
-  --rpc-url $BASE_RPC
-```
-
-This leaves existing positions in place but prevents any new recenters. LP positions continue earning fees. To resume, call `setRecenterAccess()` with the txnBot address again.
+In an attack scenario the most effective response is to upgrade or replace the contract (see §6.3 / §6.4). Existing positions remain in place and continue earning fees regardless of recenter activity.
 
 ### 6.2 Upgrade Optimizer to Safe Defaults
 
@@ -252,7 +235,7 @@ If the optimizer needs temporary override, deploy a new implementation with hard
 ### 6.5 Known Attack Response: Floor Ratchet
 
 If floor ratchet extraction is detected (rapid recenters + floor tick creeping toward current price):
-1. **Immediately** set recenter access to burn address (`0xdEaD`) — do NOT use `revokeRecenterAccess()` as it makes recenter permissionless
+1. **Immediately** assess severity — `recenter()` is permissionless (no access-control switch exists); the 60s cooldown is the only rate limiter
 2. Assess floor position state via `positions(0)`
 3. Deploy patched LiquidityManager if fix is ready
 4. Current mitigation: bear-mode parameters (AW=100) create 7000-tick floor distance, making ratchet extraction significantly harder

onchain/analysis/SECURITY_REVIEW.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ averageTick = int24(tickCumulativeDiff / int56(int32(PRICE_STABILITY_INTERVAL)))
 
 **Issue:** The fallback path observes a 60,000-second window but divides by 300 (the original 5-minute interval). This produces an `averageTick` that is 200x the actual TWAP value.
 
-**Impact:** When the fallback triggers (new pool with <5min of observation history), `_isPriceStable()` always returns `false`, making `recenter()` permanently blocked until enough observations accumulate. This is a **liveness issue** for newly deployed pools — the protocol cannot perform its first recenter without `recenterAccess` being set.
+**Impact:** When the fallback triggers (new pool with <5min of observation history), `_isPriceStable()` always returns `false`, making `recenter()` permanently blocked until enough observations accumulate. This is a **liveness issue** for newly deployed pools — the protocol cannot perform its first recenter until the pool has accumulated sufficient TWAP history.
 
 **Note:** This is fail-safe (blocks recenter rather than allowing manipulation), so it's not exploitable. However, it could delay mainnet activation.
 
@@ -80,33 +80,26 @@ function setFeeDestination(address feeDestination_) external {
 
 ---
 
-### M-3: Open `recenter()` Access Without Rate Limiting
+### M-3: Open `recenter()` Access Without Rate Limiting *(Addressed)*
 
-**Severity:** Medium (griefing)
-**File:** `src/LiquidityManager.sol:121-129`
+**Severity:** ~~Medium (griefing)~~ → **Informational (resolved)**
+**File:** `src/LiquidityManager.sol:155-172`
+
+**Original concern:** When `recenterAccess == address(0)`, anyone could call `recenter()` as long as the TWAP check passed, with no cooldown or rate limiting.
+
+**Resolution:** The `recenterAccess` role and its associated setter/revoker functions (`setRecenterAccess`, `revokeRecenterAccess`) have been **removed** from the contract. `recenter()` is now unconditionally permissionless. In their place, a `MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL = 60` second cooldown is enforced on every call path with no bypass:
 
 ```solidity
 function recenter() external returns (bool isUp) {
-    if (recenterAccess != address(0)) {
-        require(msg.sender == recenterAccess, "access denied");
-    } else {
-        require(_isPriceStable(currentTick), "price deviated from oracle");
-    }
+    (, int24 currentTick,,,,,) = pool.slot0();
+
+    // Always enforce cooldown and TWAP price stability — no bypass path
+    require(block.timestamp >= lastRecenterTime + MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL, "recenter cooldown");
+    require(_isPriceStable(currentTick), "price deviated from oracle");
+    lastRecenterTime = block.timestamp;
 ```
 
-**Issue:** When `recenterAccess == address(0)`, anyone can call `recenter()` as long as the TWAP check passes. There is no cooldown or rate limiting.
-
-**Impact:**
-- Gas griefing: attacker triggers unnecessary recenters, wasting protocol gas on position burns/mints
-- VWAP frequency manipulation: more frequent recenters with small price movements could subtly influence VWAP recording
-- Each recenter costs 540k-820k gas, so griefing has a cost to the attacker too
-
-**Mitigating factors:**
-- The TWAP oracle check (5-min, 50-tick tolerance) limits when recenter can be called
-- The amplitude check requires meaningful price movement (>400 ticks from center)
-- In practice, `recenterAccess` should be set to the txnBot address after deployment
-
-**Recommendation:** Set `recenterAccess` to the txnBot immediately after deployment. Consider adding a minimum time between recenters (e.g., 60 seconds).
+**Assessment:** The 60-second cooldown directly addresses the original gas-griefing and VWAP-frequency concerns. Combined with the amplitude check (>400 ticks from center) and TWAP oracle guard (5-min, 50-tick tolerance), the attack surface is materially reduced. No further action required.
 
 ---
 
@@ -178,10 +171,8 @@ When `outstandingSupply` reaches 0 after subtracting `pulledKraiken` and `discov
 
 | Function | Contract | Access | Notes |
 |----------|----------|--------|-------|
-| `recenter()` | LiquidityManager | `recenterAccess` or anyone (TWAP-gated) | Set recenterAccess to txnBot |
-| `setFeeDestination()` | LiquidityManager | Anyone (set-once) | Race condition risk |
-| `setRecenterAccess()` | LiquidityManager | `onlyFeeDestination` | Secure |
-| `revokeRecenterAccess()` | LiquidityManager | `onlyFeeDestination` | Secure |
+| `recenter()` | LiquidityManager | Anyone (TWAP-gated + 60s cooldown) | `recenterAccess` role removed; cooldown enforced unconditionally |
+| `setFeeDestination()` | LiquidityManager | Deployer only | Restricted post-refactor |
 | `mint()` / `burn()` | Kraiken | `onlyLiquidityManager` | Secure |
 | `setLiquidityManager()` | Kraiken | Anyone (set-once) | Race condition risk |
 | `setStakingPool()` | Kraiken | Anyone (set-once) | Race condition risk |
@@ -221,5 +212,5 @@ The protocol is ready for mainnet deployment with the following pre-launch actio
 
 1. **Fix M-1** (PriceOracle fallback divisor) — simple one-line fix
 2. **Mitigate M-2** by using bundled transactions for deployment (already the case in DeployBase.sol)
-3. **Mitigate M-3** by setting `recenterAccess` to txnBot address immediately after deployment
+3. ~~**Mitigate M-3**~~ — **Resolved:** `recenterAccess` was removed; `MIN_RECENTER_INTERVAL` (60s) cooldown is now enforced unconditionally on all `recenter()` calls
 4. **Continue tracking** the Floor Ratchet vulnerability on its dedicated branch