diff --git a/evidence/red-team/2026-03-20.json b/evidence/red-team/2026-03-20.json index d426663..b5c46a9 100644 --- a/evidence/red-team/2026-03-20.json +++ b/evidence/red-team/2026-03-20.json @@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ "eth_extracted": 0, "floor_held": true, "verdict": "floor_held", - "strategies_tested": 7, + "strategies_tested": 9, "agent_runs": 2, + "methodology": "Each attack is snapshot-isolated: Anvil snapshot before, execute strategy, measure LM total ETH via LmTotalEth.s.sol, revert to snapshot. Per-attack delta_bps reflects the isolated measurement. Top-level lm_eth_after equals lm_eth_before because all attacks were individually reverted to the clean baseline.", "attacks": [ { "strategy": "Buy → Recenter → Sell (200 ETH round trip)", @@ -23,42 +24,56 @@ "pattern": "buy → recenter → sell", "result": "INCREASED", "delta_bps": 1179, - "insight": "Larger volume amplifies fee income proportionally. 800 ETH volume generates ~118 ETH in fees. Floor position (~75% of LM ETH in 200-tick range) acts as impenetrable sell wall absorbing the sell leg." + "insight": "800 ETH buy moves price ~4000 ticks into concentrated positions, causing massive slippage. The attacker receives far fewer KRK per ETH as the trade moves through increasingly thin liquidity. Combined 1% pool fees and adverse slippage on both legs result in ~118 ETH net transfer to LM. Floor position (~75% of LM ETH in 200 ticks) absorbs the sell leg." }, { "strategy": "Multi-cycle buy → recenter (3×500 ETH) → sell all", "pattern": "buy → recenter_multi → sell", "result": "INCREASED", "delta_bps": 465, - "insight": "Multiple buy-recenter cycles compound fee income. 1500 ETH total volume generated ~46.5 ETH in fees. Each recenter repositions liquidity at the current price; subsequent trades pay fees at new ticks." + "insight": "Multiple buy-recenter cycles compound fee income. 1500 ETH total volume generated ~46.5 ETH in fees + slippage. Each recenter repositions liquidity at the current price; subsequent trades pay fees at new ticks." }, { "strategy": "Extreme Buy (2050 ETH) → Recenter at Deep Tick → Sell All", "pattern": "buy → recenter → sell", "result": "INCREASED", "delta_bps": 3746, - "insight": "The more aggressive the trading, the more the LM profits. 2050 ETH volume generates ~374 ETH in fees. Asymmetric slippage is irrelevant when fee income dominates. Deepest tick penetration tested." + "insight": "2050 ETH far exceeds pool depth (~1000 ETH in positions), causing extreme slippage on both legs. The attacker loses ~374 ETH (37% of input) — mostly to slippage through thin liquidity beyond the concentrated positions, not just the 1% fee. The LM captures all of this as position value increase. Demonstrates that over-sized trades are self-defeating." }, { "strategy": "Stake to change optimizer params → exploit repositioning", "pattern": "buy → stake → recenter", "result": "INCREASED", "delta_bps": 500, - "insight": "Staking parameter changes do not create exploitable repositioning windows. The +500 bps is entirely from the buy-leg fee income (50 ETH buy). Staking itself has no effect on LM ETH." + "insight": "Staking parameter changes do not create exploitable repositioning windows. The +500 bps is from the buy-leg fee + slippage (50 ETH buy). Staking itself has no effect on LM ETH." + }, + { + "strategy": "Exploit discovery position WETH consumption + asymmetric repositioning", + "pattern": "buy → recenter → sell", + "result": "INCREASED", + "delta_bps": 1179, + "insight": "Discovery position WETH consumption does not weaken the floor enough to enable extraction. Tested as 800 ETH round trip variant. 1% fee + slippage dominates all round-trip strategies. Subsumed by attack 2 (same pattern at same volume)." + }, + { + "strategy": "One-way sell — buy KRK, recenter, sell at stale positions (no second recenter)", + "pattern": "buy → recenter → sell", + "result": "INCREASED", + "delta_bps": 24, + "insight": "Even without follow-up recenter, LM gained ETH. The cost of acquiring KRK (buy-leg fees + slippage) exceeds what can be extracted by selling through stale positions. Tested at 200 ETH. Subsumed by attack 1 (same effective pattern)." }, { "strategy": "Send KRK Directly to LM + Recenter (Supply Manipulation)", "pattern": "buy → transfer → recenter", "result": "INCREASED", "delta_bps": 1000, - "insight": "Sending KRK to LM acts as a donation — reduces outstandingSupply and gives LM free KRK. Combined with 100 ETH buy-leg fees (~10 ETH). Floor calculation handles reduced supply gracefully." + "insight": "Sending KRK to LM acts as a donation — reduces outstandingSupply and gives LM free KRK. Combined with 100 ETH buy-leg fees + slippage (~100 ETH total LM gain). Floor calculation handles reduced supply gracefully." }, { - "strategy": "Floor Ratchet Extraction (buy → recenter_multi → sell through floor)", + "strategy": "Floor Ratchet Extraction — initial phase only (buy → recenter_multi → sell through floor)", "pattern": "buy → recenter_multi → sell", "result": "INCREASED", "delta_bps": 1179, - "insight": "Known attack vector from deep fuzzing (#630). 800 ETH buy crashes price ~4000 ticks, triggers recenters packing ETH into floor. Only 1 of 10 recenters succeeds (TWAP oracle blocks the rest). Sell through floor fully absorbed by massive floor liquidity. Net result: LM gains ~118 ETH from 1% fees. Attack remains viable only in extended 2000+ trade sequences where oracle protections are bypassed via gradual price movement." + "insight": "Tests the initial phase of the known floor ratchet vector (#630). 800 ETH buy crashes price ~4000 ticks; only 1 of 10 recenters succeeds (TWAP oracle blocks the rest). Sell through floor fully absorbed. Net: LM gains ~118 ETH. IMPORTANT: this does NOT test the full 2000-trade oscillation variant that produced profitable outcomes (9/34 runs, up to +178 ETH extracted). That variant gradually drifts TWAP to bypass oracle protections. A dedicated full-sequence run is tracked as follow-up (#1082)." } ] }