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fix: ARCHITECTURE.md staking pool bullet missing its own conditional guard (#892)

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openhands 2026-03-17 10:49:05 +00:00
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Optimizer.sol (UUPS Upgradeable Proxy)
- **feeDestination receives both WETH and KRK fees**: during `recenter()`, Uniswap V3 fee collection produces both tokens. WETH fees AND KRK fees are forwarded to `feeDestination` (see `LiquidityManager._scrapePositions()`). - **feeDestination receives both WETH and KRK fees**: during `recenter()`, Uniswap V3 fee collection produces both tokens. WETH fees AND KRK fees are forwarded to `feeDestination` (see `LiquidityManager._scrapePositions()`).
- **feeDestination is a conditional-lock (not set-once)**: `setFeeDestination()` (deployer-only) allows repeated changes while the destination is an EOA, enabling staged deployment and testing. The moment a contract address is set, `feeDestinationLocked` is set to `true` and no further changes are allowed. A CREATE2 guard also blocks re-assignment if the current destination has since acquired bytecode. This differs from Kraiken's `liquidityManager`/`stakingPool` which are strictly set-once. - **feeDestination is a conditional-lock (not set-once)**: `setFeeDestination()` (deployer-only) allows repeated changes while the destination is an EOA, enabling staged deployment and testing. The moment a contract address is set, `feeDestinationLocked` is set to `true` and no further changes are allowed. A CREATE2 guard also blocks re-assignment if the current destination has since acquired bytecode. This differs from Kraiken's `liquidityManager`/`stakingPool` which are strictly set-once.
- **feeDestination KRK excluded from outstanding supply**: `_getOutstandingSupply()` subtracts `kraiken.balanceOf(feeDestination)` before computing scarcity, because protocol-held KRK cannot be sold into the floor and should not inflate the supply count. This subtraction only occurs when `feeDestination != address(0) && feeDestination != address(this)` (see `LiquidityManager.sol:324`); when feeDestination is unset or is LM itself the balance is not subtracted. - **feeDestination KRK excluded from outstanding supply**: `_getOutstandingSupply()` subtracts `kraiken.balanceOf(feeDestination)` before computing scarcity, because protocol-held KRK cannot be sold into the floor and should not inflate the supply count. This subtraction only occurs when `feeDestination != address(0) && feeDestination != address(this)` (see `LiquidityManager.sol:324`); when feeDestination is unset or is LM itself the balance is not subtracted.
- **Staking pool KRK excluded from outstanding supply**: `_getOutstandingSupply()` also subtracts `kraiken.balanceOf(stakingPoolAddr)`, because staked KRK is locked and similarly cannot be sold into the floor. This subtraction only occurs when `stakingPoolAddr != address(0)` (see `LiquidityManager.sol:328-330`); when the staking pool is unset the balance is not subtracted. - **Staking pool KRK excluded from outstanding supply**: `_getOutstandingSupply()` also subtracts `kraiken.balanceOf(stakingPoolAddr)`, because staked KRK is locked and similarly cannot be sold into the floor. This subtraction only occurs when `stakingPoolAddr != address(0)` (see `LiquidityManager.sol:327-330`); when the staking pool is unset the balance is not subtracted.
## Three-Position Strategy ## Three-Position Strategy